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FOREWORD
In May 1995, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry asked the
Army to examine various ways to re-establish the army-to-army
ties which existed between the U.S. Army and Beijing's People's
Liberation Army (PLA) prior to the 1980s. U.S. President George
Bush ordered a curb in military-to-military ties following the
Tiananmen incident in 1989, and, since then, efforts at
rapproachment between the two armies have been faltering and
uneven.
There are some who question the value of renewing military
ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) based on the
limited gains accrued to the U.S. Army from the earlier
relationship. In this essay, U.S. Army Colonel Jer Donald Get
argues that this is a short-sighted attitude. The reasons for
renewing army-to-army ties are substantial given that China's
relevance as a power will grow. The United States needs to
marshal all the resources at its disposal to influence China
positively. One of those resources, Colonel Get argues, is
America's Army.
The ideas expressed in this monograph constitute a host of
positive recommendations which could influence the course of
trans-Pacific relations over the next decade. Our Army and the
PLA must take a measured approach, setting pragmatic objectives
and extending the reciprocity that characterizes relations
between great powers. For both armies, and both nations, the
stakes are high----to engage as strategic partners rather than
clash again in conflict.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
In the late spring of 1995, Secretary of Defense William J.
Perry asked the Secretary of the Army to look into the
restoration of functional exchanges between the American Army and
China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). This request was a major
step toward the re-establishment of U.S. Army-PLA ties suspended
by U.S. President George Bush in response to the 1989 Tiananmen
incident. Reviving functional exchanges by Chinese and American
military personnel is particularly significant because these
exchanges had been one of the "three pillars" of Sino-American
military cooperation during the 1980s. Furthermore, even though
the U.S. Army has a long- standing tradition of maintaining
military-to-military contacts with foreign armies, these contacts
and other forms of "peacetime engagement" have grown in
significance in the post-Cold War era.1 This is due to a number
of factors including the recent reduction of the U.S. Army's
force structure, personnel, and overseas presence, as well as the
nation's increasing reliance on coalition partners for deterring
or prosecuting the potential conflicts of the future.
There are, however, some who question the value of renewing
American military ties with the Chinese based on the rather
limited U.S. gains from the earlier relationship. Furthermore,
significant changes in the political environment make the U.S.
Army's re-engagement with the PLA somewhat problematic. The
original "China Card" rationale for military ties, that of using
China as a strategic counterweight against the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR), became inoperative with the USSR's
demise. Thus, criticism regarding military cooperation with what
many Americans view as a repressive Chinese regime, once muted
for the greater good of Soviet containment, has found both a
stronger voice and more receptive listeners. Additionally,
reductions in manpower, money, and materiel, when taken together
with growing worldwide demands for the attention and/or
intervention of the U.S. military, make the cost effectiveness of
investing in a relationship with a country that still harbors
significant distrust of U.S. strategic intentions rather
questionable.
Before re-establishing functional military ties with the
PLA, the U.S. Army owes itself a detailed look at the
relationship. This study, undertaken to support that process,
examines the terms of the American Army's engagement with the
PLA.
The examination begins by exploring the history of the
broader U.S.-PRC security relationship from which army-to-army
ties were derived. The brief historical expedition reveals the
security foundations of the original breakthrough in friendly
bilateral relations. The historical trace also reveals how this
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foundation first cracked under the pressures of Tiananmen and
finally crumbled with the fall of the old Cold-War bipolarity.
With the original engagement rationale overcome by world
events, the examination then focuses on answering the question of
why the U.S. Army should renew its ties to the PLA. The answer is
in three parts: first, China is relevant to U.S. interests;
second, the United States can positively influence the PRC as
China develops into a world power; and, third, one of America's
most effective engagement tools is the U.S. Army.
After validating the role of the U.S. Army in the U.S.-PRC
relationship, the study moves to an evaluation of the terms on
which the U.S. Army should renew its engagement with the PLA.
This begins with a determination of what went right and wrong for
the U.S. Army during its initial peaceful interaction with the
Chinese. From these lessons, five actions are recommended. To
secure better terms in its renewed engagement with the PLA, the
U.S. Army must:
(1) Establish a comprehensive long-range strategy with
clearly identified mission objectives.
(2) Prioritize and coordinate (internally and externally)
the identified objectives.
(3) Develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to attain
these objectives.
(4) Establish measures of effectiveness to track the
progress made toward the attainment of particular goals and
objectives.
(5) Conduct periodic assessments to refine the engagement
strategy.
Finally, in conducting this study, it was determined that a
contributing factor to the ad hoc nature of Sino-American
military ties is the lack of peacetime engagement doctrine. A
final recommendation, therefore, is for the U.S. Army to use its
ongoing work on the China engagement strategy as the baseline for
the development of a broader peacetime engagement doctrine.
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WHAT'S WITH THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN AMERICA'S ARMY AND CHINA'S PLA?
An Examination of the Terms of the
U.S. Army's Strategic Peacetime Engagement
with the People's Liberation Army of the
People's Republic of China
We believe that engagement is the best strategy to
ensure that as China increases its power it does so as
a responsible member of the international community.
And we believe that [emphasis added] is critical if
peace, prosperity and stability are to endure in Asia
and around the world.2
U.S. Secretary of Defense
William J. Perry.
As an instrument of American policy, the Army must be
ready to provide the nation a variety of tools to
influence the international environment . . . The U.S.
Army is engaged with the armies of friends around the
world through military assistance programs, joint
training exercises, and military to military
exchanges.3
From DECISIVE VICTORY:
America's Power Projection Army,
White Paper, October 1994.
The preceding statements reflect the rationale for the U.S.
Army's peacetime engagement with the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Secretary Perry's
remarks represent not only the current administration's official
policy, but also the "conventional wisdom" regarding how the
United States should deal with a rapidly modernizing Chinese
Army, intent on gaining both strength and stature in the "New
World Order." The second statement reaffirms the American Army's
long-standing role as a strategic force in U.S. foreign policy.
However, in today's complex international environment, where
demands on American soldiers are growing while their numbers and
other key resources are increasingly constrained, one might
question the wisdom of having the U.S. Army engage an army,
resistant to American values of liberty and democracy, which is
still used as an instrument of state repression. The current
national security strategy of the United States prescribes that:
"Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges
that are most relevant to our own interests and focusing our
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resources where we can make the most difference. We must also use
the right tools . . ."4 The questions that naturally follow then
are: Is China a nation both relevant to U.S. interests and
responsive to U.S. resources?, and Is the U.S. Army the right
tool for engagement? To answer these questions, this study
explores the history of the U.S. Army's peacetime engagement with
China's PLA and explains why U.S.-PRC army-to-army ties should
continue. The paper further evaluates what is both right and
wrong with the current relationship and suggests how America's
Army can create a more effective China engagement strategy for
the future.
EXPLORING THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. ARMY'S PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT
WITH THE PLA
The China Card.
On October 11, 1995, the Asia and Pacific Affairs
Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began 2
days of hearings on the Security and Military Considerations of
U.S. Policy toward China. The congressional concerns regarding
U.S. national security policy toward the PRC voiced during these
hearings were not new. They echoed those raised in similar
hearings held over a decade earlier when America was still in the
initial stages of normalizing its relations with China. At that
time, there was particular apprehension about the admin-istration
entering into a military relationship with the Chinese.5 However,
since China was seen by many foreign policy specialists in those
Cold War days as a significant counterweight to the Soviet Union,
bilateral military ties were established. In fact,
military/strategic ties provided the primary raison d'être for
Sino-American normalization.6
The origin of the modern, official, public Sino-American
military relationship can be traced to the January 1980 visit of
Defense Secretary Harold Brown to Beijing.7 The Brown visit was
followed by numerous exchanges, by a wide variety of high-ranking
defense officials from both countries, which were to become the
first of the "three pillars" of Sino-American security
cooperation. In addition to high level visits, the "three
pillars" announced by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in
1983 also included bilateral functional exchanges by
military/security subject matter experts and the sale by the
United States of defensive military weapons, equipment, and
technology to China.8
The U.S. Army had significant involvement in each of the
"three pillars." Between 1981 and 1988, there were five high
level army-to-army exchanges (see Appendix A). Second pillar
functional exchanges focused primarily on training. The
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Department of the Army delegated responsibility for the conduct
of the training exchanges to its Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) located at Fort Monroe, Virginia. From 1984 to 1989,
TRADOC participated in four exchange visits (training seminar
list at Appendix B). Other U.S. Army functional level interaction
with the Chinese included Corps of Engineer cooperative studies
with PRC research institutes from 1986 to 1989; a U.S. military
history delegation visit to China in 1987; and Army participation
in U.S. Defense Department-hosted logistics, medical, and
educational exchanges. Under the third pillar of technology
transfer and weapons sales, the Chinese expressed interest in a
number of Army weapons systems including TOW anti-tank missiles,
Redeye and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, artillery munitions,
artillery counter-battery radar systems, and scout, transport,
and attack helicopters. From these, the U.S. Army initiated two
projects under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program--the
transfer of technology related to the modernization of Chinese
artillery ammunition known as the Large Caliber Ammunition
Modernization Program (LCAMP), and the sale of U.S.-manufactured
AN/TPQ-37 "Firefinder" counter-battery radar systems. Both of
these were suspended prior to completion due to the Tiananmen
incident.
Clearly, through the 1980s America's Army was an active
supporter of the military-to-military relationship between the
United States and China. In fact, the Army's LCAMP was the only
FMS program close to completion prior to Tiananmen. Furthermore,
the sale to the PRC of the AN/TPQ-37 "Firefinder" radar systems
included a training package whereby a number of Chinese soldiers
actually were trained on the system at the U.S. Army Artillery
School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. These PLA soldiers were later able
to demonstrate their capability with the radar to the American
TRADOC Commander, General Maxwell Thurman, when he visited China
in the summer of 1988. Finally, the U.S. Army's top two leaders,
Secretary of the Army John Marsh and Chief of Staff of the Army
General Carl Vuono were scheduled to visit the PRC as the decade
was coming to a close. Secretary Marsh's trip, originally
scheduled for the spring of 1988, was postponed by the United
States because of American human rights concerns regarding
China's handling of its Tibetan minority. General Vuono, who was
scheduled to visit China in June of 1989, was asked by the
Chinese to postpone his trip because of their concerns about a
growing democracy demonstration at Tiananmen Square.
Crisis At The Heavenly Gate And A Change In The Correlation Of
Forces.
The year 1989 was a watershed for Sino-American ties as two
momentous events were to change the fundamental nature of the
relationship. First, the decision of the Chinese government to
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use massive military force to deal with the democracy movement at
Tiananmen Square horrified the American people and led to a June
5th order from President George Bush for the U.S. Defense
Department to suspend all military cooperation with the PRC. The
immediate effect of this presidential order on U.S. Army
relations with the PLA essentially was to cancel the previously
postponed China visits of both the Secretary of the Army and the
Army's Chief of Staff, end the annual bilateral training
seminars, withhold the delivery of hardware and software which
would have closed out the LCAMP FMS project, and withhold the
delivery of two AN/TPQ-37 "Firefinder" radar systems.
The second major event affecting U.S.-PRC army-to-army ties
was the fall of the Berlin Wall, which marked the beginning of
the end of the Cold War. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact
and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the U.S.
accommodation with the PRC was no longer deemed essential to
containing Soviet expansionism.9 Thus, the Chinese lost the
strategic cover that had, in the past, helped American Cold
Warriors overlook the ills and transgressions of the PRC and
other authoritarian regimes.
After Tiananmen, A Gradual Renewal.
In the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen, U.S. Army contact
with the PLA was severely restricted. By late summer of 1990,
however, the United States moderated its restrictions against
contact with the Chinese military, as the American government was
looking for PRC cooperation in responding to Saddam Hussein's
invasion of Kuwait. As part of its campaign to persuade the
Chinese not to veto the U.S.-authored United Nations (UN)
resolution for the use of all means available (i.e., force) to
deal with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration
reinitiated limited official Sino-American military contact. At
the inception of Operation DESERT SHIELD, PRC military attache
visits to Department of Defense (DoD) personnel were approved on
a case-by-case basis and restricted to U.S. military personnel of
the ranks of two-star general/admiral and below. However, by the
end of DESERT STORM, PLA attaches in Washington were starting to
gain access to higher-ranking military officials and were
routinely receiving briefings on U.S. operations in the Gulf.
Furthermore, in the euphoria of the war's successful completion,
the United States even included the PRC as a coalition partner in
the June 8, 1991, victory parade down Constitution Avenue in
Washington, DC. Once again, security cooperation protected the
PRC from its American critics. However, for some opponents to the
U.S. engagement with China, this Gulf War cover was to be as
short lived as the conflict itself.
After the liberation of Kuwait, the American domestic debate
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over U.S. policy toward the PRC tended once again to focus on the
Chinese government's human rights record, which had been linked
by congressional pressure to the administration's annual renewal
of the PRC's Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status. Opponents of
MFN renewal also cited their concerns with China's proliferation
of nuclear and missile technology, rapidly rising trade surplus
with the United States, and its failure to protect American
intellectual property rights. In order to renew MFN and blunt
criticism that they were "soft" on China, both the late Bush and
the early Clinton administrations tended to limit Sino-American
dialogue to human rights and trade discussions, which precluded
the advancement of security initiatives. However, by the end of
President Clinton's first year in office, the U.S. Government
signaled its desire to reopen the suspended high-level SinoAmerican military dialogue by dispatching Assistant Secretary of
Defense Charles Freeman to Beijing to meet with PLA leaders.
Secretary Freeman concluded his 2 days of talks with "an
agreement to a ‘modest' agenda of future dialogue and
professional exchanges."10
The "modest" military dialogue was initiated in the
military-academic arena with a January 1994 China visit by a U.S.
National Defense University (NDU) delegation led by American Army
Lieutenant General Paul Cerjan, the NDU President. This was
followed by an August visit to the United States by a PLA Deputy
Chief of the General Staff, General Xu Huizi, whose itinerary
included a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Perry. Perry, in
turn, made his first visit to China as the Secretary of Defense
in October of that year. Sino-American military exchanges (to
include additional reciprocal high-level visits and the first
U.S. Navy ship visit to China since Tiananmen) continued through
the first half of 1995, when they were essentially frozen by the
Chinese in protest of the U.S. Government allowing President of
Taiwan Lee Teng Hui to visit the United States. Lee's visit,
which led the Chinese leadership to question America's commitment
to a "one China policy," together with increasingly vocal
disagreements over human rights, trade, and weapons proliferation
issues, plunged Sino-American diplomatic relations to their
lowest point since Tiananmen. Despite this rift, the U.S. defense
establishment steadfastly maintained its policy objective of
peaceful engagement as an element of the Clinton administration's
comprehensive engagement strategy with the PRC. This position was
reiterated by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, Joseph Nye, during his October 11, 1995,
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and
Pacific Affairs. (See Appendix C for the new "five pillars" of
the Sino-American security engagement.)
Thus, even though the Chinese had postponed the June 1995
U.S. visit of their Defense Minister, General Chi Haotian
(rescheduled to begin April 6, 1996, but again postponed due to
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tensions over Taiwan's presidential elections), the PLA was
allowed to participate in lower level functional visits on
logistics and air traffic control. However, even though U.S. Army
personnel participated in the post-Tiananmen round of SinoAmerican military exchanges, the American Army, as an
institution, was not a major player until Secretary Perry
dispatched a May 1995 memorandum to Secretary of the Army Togo
West asking the U.S. Army "to explore the feasibility of
conducting functional exchanges with the PLA in the areas of
training and military jurisprudence."11 In preparing its response
to the Secretary of Defense, the Department of the Army had an
ideal opportunity to examine fully the goals and objectives of
U.S. peacetime engagement with the Chinese Army; then, reassess
its own prior army-to-army engagement results; and, finally,
apply the lessons of the past to develop a comprehensive and
coordinated plan for the future.
EXPLAINING THE U.S. ARMY'S PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PLA
The "Why's" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: Why China?
Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the
challenges that are most relevant to our own interests
and focusing our resources where we can make the most
difference. We must also use the right tools . . .12
The easiest explanation of why the U.S. Army should
participate in peacetime engagement operations with China's PLA
is to execute a mission specifically requested by the Secretary
of Defense. This simplistic rationale, however, ill serves both
the Army itself and the nation it defends. For the U.S. Army to
play an effective role in comprehensive engagement with China,
its leadership must have a sound understanding of their
Commander-in-Chief's intent. Thus, it is first necessary to
understand the rationale for the broader Sino-American security
relationship.
A most obvious initial question that must be answered is,
Why is China relevant to U.S. interests? In his recent testimony
before the Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord offered these facts
on the PRC's relevance:
China is not only the most populous country in the
world, with 1.2 billion people, but it has the largest
standing army. Even after a 25% reduction in its armed
forces in the late 1980's, it still has 3 million men
and women in arms. China is a nuclear power, and along
with France, the only country in the world still
testing nuclear weapons, to our regret. China possesses
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ballistic missiles, including ones capable of reaching
the United States. It is a permanent member of the UN
Security Council, with the rights and responsibilities
that go with membership in that exclusive club.13
China's relevance to the United States is directly related
to its power. While its military might is currently nowhere near
that of the United States, the PRC, with its nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), can inflict grievous harm
to America's territory and citizens. In the world political
arena, China's UN veto authority gives it the power to thwart
American international interests. This was evidenced by U.S.
concerns over the previously mentioned PRC vote during the
buildup to the Gulf war and America's recent frustration with
China's reluctance to support a UN resolution condemning the
February 1996 Cuban shoot-down of two U.S. civilian aircraft.
Yet, what is even more important for Americans to understand is
the relevance of China's future power potential to U.S. national
interests. Though it is not yet a dominant economic force in the
world, the PRC, which enjoyed a 1995 trade surplus with the
United States of almost $33 billion, is projected to have the
world's largest economy in the first part of the 21st century.
Furthermore, it is apparent from the PLA's ongoing defense
modernization that the PRC is developing force projection
capabilities which will soon make it a major regional military
power. Additionally, assuming China's defense modernization is
able to parallel its economic development, there is a strong
possibility that sometime in the 21st century the PRC will be a
major military power capable of challenging the United States.14
In summary, then, as Secretary Perry recently remarked, "A new
geopolitical order is being created in the Asia Pacific region as
one of the world's most ancient nations (China) emerges as one of
the world's most powerful nations."15
The "Whys" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: Why Engagement?
Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the
challenges that are most relevant to our own interests
and focusing our resources where we can make the most
16
difference. We must also use the right tools . . .
During his October 1995 confirmation hearings, U.S.
Ambassador-designee to the People's Republic of China James J.
Sasser reflected not only the importance the U.S. government
places on the Sino-American relationship, but also its belief
that America can make a difference in China's development. He
testified that,
Secretary (of State) Christopher has said our
relationship with China is one of the most important
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bilateral relationships we have. Even without a
cooperative relationship with the United States, China
will continue, no doubt, in growth and influence,
albeit at a lower rate. But a constructive American
relationship with China can play an important role in
the development of Chinese policies and attitudes in
the pivotal post-Deng (Xiao Ping) era. Our interests
dictate that we move boldly to establish a productive
bilateral relationship with China.17
The basic premise behind America's comprehensive engagement
with the PRC is that such a strategy will facilitate the orderly
entry of China, an acknowledged regional and potential world
power, into international and regional affairs and allow the
world to avoid the conflict that accompanied the rise of earlier
powers such as Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan in the 1930s. This
premise is reflected in America's most recently published
national security strategy which states,
Our (U.S.) leadership must stress preventive diplomacy- through such means as support for democracy, economic
assistance, overseas military presence, military to
military contacts, and involvement in multilateral
negotiations . . . in order to help resolve problems,
reduce tensions, and defuse conflicts before they
become crises.18
The more specific reasons the U.S. Government is currently
attempting to engage the Chinese in the security arena were
articulated by Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye during his
October 1995 congressional testimony. (See Appendix D for the
seven reasons cited by Secretary Nye.)
Yet, even if one accepts the validity of the need for
America's strategic engagement with the PRC, the operative
question then becomes whether or not China is responsive to
American influences. For a variety of reasons, the answer is a
"qualified" yes. First, there is significant anecdotal evidence
of engagement leading to the Chinese government's acquiescence to
U.S. initiatives. This has been true not only in the security
arena, which saw Beijing helping the United States reach an
agreement with North Korea to stop the North Korean nuclear
weapon's program,19 but also in a number of other areas as well.
One area was economics, where China agreed to open its markets to
U.S. farm products and to hold talks on allowing more U.S.
telecommunications and insurance services.20 Another was human
rights, with China's 1995 adoption of a law that allows its
citizens to recover damages from the government for infringement
of their rights.21 Second, there is also ample evidence that,
when the U.S. Government has chosen to focus its resources,
there are few countries in the world that have been able to
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resist. Yet, one must always keep in mind that, for most matters,
the "yes" answer is "qualified" because there are limits both to
the degree of PRC accommodation and to what the United States can
focus on at any particular time.
Even with these limitations, America's strategic engagement
with China's military is sound policy because, with or without
direct influence, strategic engagement with the PRC brings
America other benefits. The most important of these is access to
and a channel for communicating with the PLA, an important
segment of Chinese leadership. Increased bilateral communication
normally leads to increased understanding, which can prevent
military miscalculations that have so often in the past led to
armed conflict.
The "Whys" of the Army-to Army Relationship: Why the Army?
Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the
challenges that are most relevant to our own interests
and focusing our resources where we can make the most
difference. We must also use the right tools . . .22
The rationale for America's Army to be involved in the
comprehensive engagement strategy with the PRC is two-fold. The
first is related to the dominant role the PLA plays in Chinese
politics. The roots of the PLA's political power were succinctly
described in the recent congressional testimony of Richard D.
Fisher, who stated,
In China, to an even higher degree than most other
communist systems, the military is an integral part of
the political power equation: it brought the Chinese
Communist Party to power, remains its ultimate
guarantor, and is a key tool for fulfilling the Party's
international goals.23
Thus, in order to engage China's leadership, the U.S. must engage
the leadership of China's Army.
The second reason for Army involvement in engagement is
related to the special part the U.S. Army plays in American
defense and foreign policy. As reported to the U.S. Congress in
its Fiscal Year 1996 posture statement,
America's Army plays a unique role in the defense of
the nation. As the strategic core of U.S. forces for
joint or multilateral operations, the Army can be used
by national leaders to . . . demonstrate U.S.
capabilities, promote stability, and contribute to the
nation's ability to influence world events.24
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The U.S. Army sees its role as being particularly important in
the peaceful engagement of foreign nations because,
In most nations, armies are the foundation of military
forces . . . . This means that America's Army, as the
counterpart of the armies of other nations, is an
indispensable tool to influence the policies and
practices of other nations, through nation assistance,
army-to-army contacts, security assistance and shared
training.25
Finally, while the validity of this statement may be debatable
for some nations, there is little doubt that in China the
People's Liberation Army is the dominant military service. In the
words of Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, a former PoliticoMilitary Affairs Officer with service in both the Pacific Command
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "The Army is
generally the dominant service in Asian countries and it most
certainly is in the PRC. It is important for the U.S. Army as an
institution to engage the PLA."26
The underlying justification for the American Army's
strategic mission of peacetime engagement with China's PLA is
essentially sound. Sound mission justification does not, however,
necessarily lead to successful mission accomplishment. In fact,
it is the perception that the U.S. military gained precious
little of substance from its prior strategic cooperation with
China in the 1980s that causes some to oppose renewing the SinoAmerican military engagement. Yet, America's Army should not be
precluded from building ties to the PLA by the perceived or real
failures of their earlier interaction. Rather, the U.S. Army
should take advantage of that experience to develop a strategy
for the peacetime engagement of the Chinese Army, which both
eliminates what was wrong as well as reinforces what was right
with their previous engagement.
EVALUATING THE U.S. ARMY'S PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PLA
The "What's" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: What's Wrong?
. . . the confusion and controversy surrounding U.S.
policy toward China reflects the fact that American
foreign policy more generally is also in a state of
serious disarray . . . Without a consensus on a new
national strategy in the post-Cold War era, the context
for a new American policy toward China will remain
uncertain.27
Much of what has been wrong with the development of a
constructive U.S. Army relationship with the PLA stems from
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friction in the overall Sino-American relationship. Many of these
larger problems can be attributed to the failure of the American
government to articulate an overarching strategy with clear
priorities and measurable objectives for dealing with China. This
has been particularly true since Tiananmen and apparently still
plagues the current administration. According to Leon T. Hader of
the Cato Institute, significant intergency disagreements
characterize management of U.S. policy toward China,
For example, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and
his human rights aides threatened Beijing with trade
sanctions if it refused to release dissidents just days
after top Commerce Department officials had bombarded
the Chinese with new U.S. trade and investment
proposals. Similarly, after John H. F. Shattuck, the
State Department's top human rights officer, attacked
the Chinese for their human rights abuses, Secretary of
Defense William Perry and other Pentagon officials
announced their plans to pursue contacts with the
Chinese military, described as prime villains in the
1989 Tiananmen Square killings.28
The lack of a well-defined strategy adversely affects Sino-U.S.
relations in a number of ways. First, with priorities for
engaging China described by one operator currently involved in
policy execution as a "food fight," executive branch departmental
interactions with China can appear from China's perspective to be
ad hoc, competitive, personality driven, uncoordinated, and at
cross-purposes. This puts American policy officials at a decided
disadvantage when negotiating with their Chinese counterparts. It
also leaves the administration's comprehensive engagement policy
vulnerable to inquiry, influence, and interference from opponents
both at home and abroad.
The absence of an administration plan has also been cited as
a key reason no political consensus on the broader subject of
overall Sino-American ties exists in either Washington or
Beijing. On the American side, the lack of consensus has been
most visible in the legislative branch where there are a
multitude of views on how to deal with the PRC. Factors
contributing to the varied views among congressional
representatives include a belief that the executive branch has
often failed either to consult with or inform Congress of
administration initiatives regarding China;29 a perception that
the Chinese government has been reluctant to cooperate with the
United States in the areas of human rights,30 trade,31 and weapons
proliferation;32 and strong residual ties among some members of
Congress to America's former Chinese Nationalist allies on
Taiwan.33
A particular problem that politicization has brought to the
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army-to-army ties is the disruption of the high-level exchanges
which serve as one of the basic foundations of the developing
relationship. These have included the politically motivated
cancellation of U.S. Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh's 1988
Beijing visit and the postponement of PRC Defense Minister Chi
Haotian's 1995/1996 U.S. visit (now rescheduled for late 1996).
Politicization has also hurt Sino-American defense conversion
cooperation, another pillar of the current relationship. In a
move many observers attribute to partisan politics, the U.S.
Congress eliminated funding for U.S. participation in SinoAmerican defense conversion cooperation by inserting special
restrictive language in the Fiscal Year 1996 Defense
Authorization Bill.
The Chinese Army's participation in the bilateral
relationship is, of course, also affected by its country's
domestic politics, as the leadership in China is also split
regarding Sino-American cooperation. The most divisive issue is
an argument over American intentions toward the PRC. One major
group in Beijing distrusts the West in general and sees the U.S.
policy of comprehensive engagement in particular as being a code
name for the containment of China.34 Another Chinese leadership
element takes a more positive view toward the West and believes
the American engagement policy is benign.35 PRC internal
politics, however, do not fully explain the PLA's record of
uneven cooperation, a third major problem encountered by the U.S.
Army in its engagement with the Chinese. One of the more constant
complaints by Americans who have dealt with the Chinese military
is the PLA's unwillingness to reciprocate in terms of frankness
in discussions, access to people and information, and other
activities normally associated with bilateral military
exchanges.36 While Chinese uniformed leaders are constantly
soliciting data and opinions from their American counterparts,
their typical offerings and responses to U.S. presentations are
mostly a rote reiteration of "party line" positions. Furthermore,
in their meetings with Americans, PLA leaders often open their
remarks with general assertions in an attempt to control and
limit discussion.37
One of the most frustrating problems for U.S. military
representatives visiting China is having to deal with their
counterparts through the PRC Defense Ministry's Foreign Affairs
Bureau (FAB). One senior U.S. Army official described the FAB as
the PLA's modern "barbarian handlers," whose mission is to
construct bureaucratic barriers both to control their own PLA
personnel and keep the Americans at arms length. Another
technique the PLA uses to perpetuate the uneven relationship is
to "kill their guests with kindness." Under this rubric, the
mandatory escorts assigned to U.S. visitors are not there to
watch the Americans or restrict access (which they do quite
effectively) but to ensure that the "foreign guests" are
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comfortable and safe from "bad elements." An additional PLA ploy
is to include the spouses when inviting U.S. leaders, which has
often had the effect of transforming substantive military
exchanges into tourist visits. The Chinese have also been known
to make last minute changes to discussion topics or venues to
catch their counterparts off guard.
Another problem in the general U.S. military engagement with
China which also adversely affects the army-to-army relationship
is in the area of doctrine. Although military-to-military
contacts are identified as a key program in the peacetime
engagement component of the U.S. national military strategy,
there is currently no doctrine on how to execute those contacts.
Doctrine is important because it "provides a military
organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a
common purpose, and a unity of effort."38 As one of its six
institutional imperatives, doctrine is even more critical to the
U.S. Army because it
touches all aspects of the Army. It facilitates
communications between Army personnel no matter where
they serve, establishes a shared professional culture
and approach to operations, and serves as the basis for
curriculum in the Army school system. Doctrine
permeates the entire organizational structure of the
Army and sets the standard for leadership development
and soldier training.39
With no doctrine to guide the development of military-tomilitary contacts, a key part of America's military engagement
with the Chinese (like the overall U.S. China policy) has been a
succession of ad hoc experiments subjected to unnecessary,
counterproductive, and personality-driven internecine rivalry.
Another major failing in the past Sino-American army-to-army
relationship was the absence of the Army Reserve and National
Guard in the China engagement activities. Although the National
Guard Bureau had expressed a strong interest in participating in
the early development of the relationship, this interest was
largely overlooked by the Department of the Army staff officers
who worked the issue at that time. This omission cannot be
allowed to continue, as it is completely contrary to the "Total
Army" spirit. Moreover, in today's constrained fiscal
environment, the National Guard and the Reserves are resources
that the active Army leadership cannot afford to overlook when
considering current and future peacetime engagement operations.
One final negative aspect of past U.S.-PRC army
that almost everything that happened was driven from
down. With the focus on strategic ties, particularly
Soviets were still a threat, little or no engagement
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ties was
the top
when the
input was

solicited from America's operational and tactical soldiers who
were the ones tasked to provide the briefings, demonstrations,
and escorts for the visiting Chinese military delegations. The
failure to get this segment of the U.S. Army involved in the
army-to-army relationship with the Chinese (other than as
training aids) was a missed opportunity, for, as the current Army
Chief of Staff has repeatedly pointed out, these soldiers are not
just in the Army, they are the Army.
The "What's" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: What's Right?
This (American) policy of
China is not new. Indeed,
has been pursued for over
presidents, both democrat
solid track record.40

comprehensive engagement with
U.S. engagement with China
20 years by six American
and republican, and it has a

It is quite a challenge identifying what is right with the
Sino-American army-to-army relationship. This is because, at
first glance, there appears to be little evidence of the U.S.
Army receiving any substantive benefit from peacetime engagement
with the PLA. A closer investigation, however, reveals that there
have been some positive aspects to U.S.-PRC security ties.
First, they are part of a larger peaceful contemporary SinoAmerican relationship that has survived many ups, downs, and near
crises since normalization in 1979. It is also heartening to note
that, despite a myriad of disputes, a succession of leaders in
both the United States and China have recognized the importance
of this relationship and have remained committed to its continued
development.41 Furthermore, even though changes in the
international environment altered the original foundation of the
security ties, the military leadership of both countries
understands the need to continue it.42
While they are hard to measure objectively, there have been
a number of intangible benefits of Sino-American security
relations in general and the army-to-army ties in particular.
Foremost is access to and a direct means of communicating with
the PLA, a key segment of China's leadership. This direct line of
communication has been proven repeatedly to be important to U.S.
interests. For example, army-to-army contacts played an important
role in gaining Chinese cooperation in two key areas during the
Gulf War, that is, securing the PRC's commitment not to veto the
UN Security Council resolution allowing the use of force to
liberate Kuwait and getting technical information on Chinese
weapons systems used by the Iraqi forces to develop
countermeasures. Direct communications between Chinese and
American military leaders also proved valuable in moderating the
tensions that had built up on the Korean peninsula in the summer
of 1994 due to North Korea's nuclear weapons development and
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aggressive force posture. U.S.-PRC military-to-military contacts
are believed to be one of the factors that persuaded China to
play a positive role in the successful multilateral effort to
contain North Korea's nuclear ambition. These communications
links were also used to reassure the Chinese regarding U.S.
strategic intentions toward North Korea when the Commander-inChief of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), Admiral Charles Larson,
was able to use a visit to Beijing to reassure the PLA personally
that the U.S. actions taken in response to North Korea were
defensive in nature and not the precursor to a preemptive
attack.43
Another benefit of increased U.S. military contacts with the
PLA is that these contacts have also led to an increased American
understanding of China's ongoing military modernization goals and
objectives. During recent NDU leader exchanges, senior PLA
leaders were more forthcoming about issues of multilateralism and
budget transparency than they had ever been. According to one
report, the PLA visitors shared information "unprecedented in its
candor and specificity."44
Another area that has seen significant improvement is the
inclusion of regional forces in the planning and execution of the
U.S. military's peacetime engagement with the Chinese. While the
Defense and Service Attaches in Beijing have always been key
players in the U.S.-PRC military relationship, the participation
of the PACOM's Unified and Component Commands has been rather
uneven. Recently, however, the PACOM and its supporting component
commands have been proactive participants in the development and
execution of Sino-U.S. military engagement plans. The U.S. Army
Pacific has played an especially active role in hosting the
Chinese Army in recent multilateral gatherings such as the annual
Pacific Armies Management Seminars.
One final element that is right with the current state of
the Sino-American army ties is the U.S. Army's recognition of its
need to develop a strategy for engaging the PLA in order to
optimize the relationship. Taking a long term strategic approach
to the contacts with China's PLA should help the American Army
avoid the failings of the past and allow it to build a
relationship with the Chinese Army that will stand the test of
time.
The "What's" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: What's the Army To
Do?
Initiating and sustaining cooperation is never easy,
because it not only requires that both sides have
common interests but also requires that their conflicts
of interests be either insignificant or manageable.
More often than not, there are significant preexisting
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and ongoing bilateral conflicts, so that establishing
and sustaining cooperation requires mutual adjustment
and extensive negotiations. Cooperation is neither
spontaneous nor self-perpetuating. Maintaining
cooperative relations requires considerable effort by
both parties.45
The establishment of a cooperative relationship with China's
PLA will require a significant effort on the part of America's
Army. The first order of business is to establish a clear
strategy. Clarity requires the Department of the Army (DA) Staff
to identify the goals and objectives it desires from the
peacetime engagement of the PLA, as well as the means to attain
them. In developing these means, goals, and objectives, former
U.S. Ambassador to China J. Stapleton Roy recommended that the
Army take a step back and evaluate the situation with a long-term
perspective. He also offered the opinion that the Army should
determine not only what it wants, but also how easy or difficult
its objectives will be to attain. Ambassador Roy further
cautioned the Army not to push harder than the traffic can bear.
One possible U.S. Army objective offered by the Ambassador was to
demonstrate to the PLA that the United States does, in fact, have
the best military forces in the world. This would be done to
prevent the Chinese from underestimating America's ability to
respond to a crisis in the Far East. Another objective should be
to persuade the PLA that the United States has neither a desire
nor a design to "contain" China. Finally, contacts with the PLA
could also help the U.S. Army's leadership gain insight into the
thought processes of their Chinese counterparts.46
Clearly understanding what the traffic can bear is
particularly important in the currently highly politicized SinoAmerican relationship. One regional operator pointed out that
there have been a couple of conflict areas that have tended to
dominate the relationship.47 A prime example of a "hot button"
issue was the proposed April 6, 1996, U.S. visit by PRC Defense
Minister General Chi Haotian, who was in a key PLA leadership
position in 1989 when the Army was used to suppress dissidents at
Tiananmen Square. This visit, originally scheduled for June 1995,
was again postponed due to significant bipartisan opposition in
the U.S. Congress.48 Another controversial issue involves
possible U.S. military discussions with the PLA on advanced
command and control communications technology. Understanding
and, if necessary, avoiding those issues that are not politically
supported by the administration or the Congress are key to
setting one boundary of the U.S. Army's peacetime engagement with
the PLA.
It is equally important for the U.S. Army to recognize that
there are "traffic cops" on the PRC's side of the relationship
who will limit what the bilateral traffic will bear. In order to
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define the engagement strategy's Chinese boundary, the DA Staff
must determine what the PLA is willing to bring to the
relationship. Awareness of these boundaries is significant for
two important reasons. First, this knowledge will allow the Army
to conserve resources by not investing operator or staff time
preparing for unexecutable bilateral activities. Second, this
boundary will also set the bottom-line for U.S. Army-PLA
engagement negotiations.
Once the general external boundaries have been determined,
the next step in developing the Army's engagement strategy is to
gain an understanding of the relative priority of internal (Army
only) and external (other agencies) objectives. Then the Army
should determine how focusing on any one issue will affect the
ability to achieve progress on the others.49 These processes
require measures of effectiveness to track the progress toward
the attainment of particular goals and objectives. Yet, one must
be careful in choosing measures of effectiveness. Ambassador Roy
warns that the Army should not let its China policy be defined in
terms of what is not under American control. Rear Admiral
McDevitt also cautions that "rigid ‘bench marks' will put
engagement under the control of the PRC. The Chinese will then
dictate the pace by what they decide they are willing to do."50
There are, however, other ways to measure the effectiveness of
and progress in Sino-American army-to-army ties than the rigid
reciprocity and bench marks currently being employed. For
example, one measure of progress could be the topical content of
what the Chinese military is willing to discuss with their
American counterparts during high level and functional exchanges.
Another measure is the level and type of PLA academic
institutions accessible to U.S. soldiers. The task for the DA
staff, then, is to create a menu of prioritized options with
multiple measures of effectiveness. This menu will enhance
operational flexibility while providing a way to measure
progress.
To gain an understanding of both the contentious issues and
the relative priority of objectives mentioned above, the American
Army faces another imperative in the development of its China
engagement strategy. That imperative is comprehensive
coordination, which is essential if Army actions involving the
PRC are to be complementary to rather than at cross purposes with
those of other U.S. agencies.
Internal staff coordination has to cover the full spectrum
of Army activities. Horizontally, coordination must encompass the
"Total Army" structure, including the Army Reserves, the Army
National Guard, and the Department of the Army civilian work
force. The Reserve component adds value to the engagement
process by bringing skills of interest to the PLA not always
found in the active force. More importantly, however, is the

17

visible testimony America's citizen soldiers give regarding the
strength and power of the Army of a democracy. Thus, "Total Army"
coordination can only enrich the possibilities in the menu of
engagement options.
Vertical coordination must be from the Army Secretariat down
to the operating forces. The tactical forces, in particular, have
much to offer the DA Staff as it develops the implementing
objectives of the Army's China strategy. For example, America's
Army has a tremendous asset available in its 25th Infantry
Division (Light) (ID(L)) at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. The 25th
ID(L), also known as the Tropic Lightning Division, currently
represents the U.S. Army and the U.S. Pacific Command in a number
of activities with several foreign armies in the Pacific theater
through U.S. Army Forces, PACOM's Expanded Relations Program
(ERP). The Division has already provided tactical demonstrations
for high ranking Chinese military visitors to include PLA
Generals Xu Huizi and Zhu Dunfa. According to one division staff
officer, interaction with the PLA would be a tremendous teaching
and learning opportunity for Tropic Lightning soldiers. The 25th
ID(L) could share its knowledge through a number of individual
and small unit infantry courses conducted by its outstanding
Light Infantry Training Command (LITC) and Non-Commissioned
Officers Academy (NCOA). Conversely, the LITC and NCOA cadre have
a continuing interest in the field craft (e.g., tracking,
infiltration, marksmanship) of all armies in the Pacific,
including China's PLA.
The U.S. Army's formal external staff coordination should
begin with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA), which has been
designated the lead agency for Defense Department elements
dealing with the PLA. In the development and execution of its
China strategy, the DA Staff should be in constant and close
contact with the OSD/ISA country director for China, who will
normally set the azimuth and boundaries for U.S.-PRC security
engagement actions. The Army staff should also maintain close
liaison with staff counterparts from the other services (Marines,
Navy, and Air Force) and the Joint Staff (J-2 and J-5). Meetings
with this core group should take place on a routine basis
(probably monthly) to identify and deconflict potential problem
areas, exchange good ideas, and synchronize future actions.
Direct Army coordination should also be effected on an asrequired basis with the various other agencies concerned with
China that belong to or are in support of the Department of
Defense.49 Additionally, because of the highly politicized nature
of Sino-American relations, the Army must maintain an awareness
of the concerns of the U.S. Congress when developing and
implementing its peacetime engagement strategy for the PRC.
Congressional concerns or legislation potentially affecting U.S.PRC army ties should be routinely addressed by the Army
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leadership through its Office of Congressional and Legislative
Liaison.
Informal coordination on China issues by the Army should, of
course, be limited only by the time and energy the DA staff has
to devote to the particular issue or action. Fortunately for the
Army there are a plethora of China experts in the close vicinity
of the Pentagon. Among the resources available are the agencies
in the U.S. intelligence community, offices in the Department of
State and other executive departments, think tanks, academic
institutions, as well as congressional researchers and staffers.
Because of the high level of interest in Sino-American relations
and the number of players involved, the full coordination of the
Army's engagement strategy will be a laborious and time consuming
effort. This effort must be undertaken, however, if the Army's
peacetime engagement of the PLA is to have politically realistic
goals and objectives.
Although the completion of a clear and coordinated
engagement strategy would certainly be a step in the right
direction, this cannot be the terminal objective of the Army
staff. In addition to building its China strategy, the DA Staff
must also develop sound procedures for its successful
implementation, for history has demonstrated that even great
strategies have been doomed to failure by poor execution.
The first recommended procedure is to ensure that every U.S.
Army leader who is likely to be involved in direct interaction
with the PLA is thoroughly briefed on how the Chinese will
approach the relationship. Knowledge of the PLA approach is
particularly important in these early stages of the renewal of
army ties as American repre- sentatives are preparing to
negotiate the terms for moving the relationship forward. This is
because Americans in the past have learned,
The contrasting approach to the bilateral relationship
also affected the course of (U.S.-PRC) negotiations.
China was often content to defer compromise and
agreement until it extracted maximum U.S. concessions;
it never compromised until it had to, often at the last
minute. It adopted an "optimizing" bargaining strategy
. . . . But whereas China rejected compromise until
necessary, the United States adopted its problem
solving approach and presented China with a succession
of conciliatory proposals, hoping to elicit Chinese
compromise and renewed cooperation. The United States
adopted an "accommodative" approach to resolving
conflict. In such circumstances, Chinese leaders
acquiesced only when the United States refused to make
additional concessions, leaving them with the choice of
either compromise or escalated conflict. Beijing always
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chose compromise.52
Another key reason for U.S. Army leaders to receive extensive
briefing on PLA negotiating tactics is to forewarn them that,
Chinese negotiators tend to exploit the psychological
dimension of interpersonal relations. Such highly
personalized diplomacy is intended to create
obligations and attitudes receptive to psychological
demands. The full implication of such techniques as old
friends, shame and sympathy, criticism, and nonverbal
communications are often not recognized by Americans.
Generally these techniques are very effective
stimulating the friendly or hostile responses that help
the Chinese negotiator maintain the initiative.53
These and other tactics such as late changes of agendas or venues
have historically been used by the PLA to protect Chinese
interests in dealing with Americans. Briefing U.S.
representatives on Chinese negotiating tactics should help them
recognize these tactics and expect their employment by the PLA.
Briefings should also include positive procedures for
dealing with the Chinese military. One such procedure was
provided by a senior U.S. naval officer who has had extensive
dealings with the PLA. He noted, "The way to get the attention of
China's leadership is for U.S. objectives to be clear and
constantly reinforced by including them as talking points for all
U.S. visitors to China, e.g., Commerce, State, Defense, etc."54
In its preliminary stages of engagement, the U.S. side
should also offer to set up a bilateral Executive Steering
Committee (ESC). The Chinese and American members of this
committee would work together to set up the initial engagement
parameters and then mutually guide the relationship through its
early development. This approach is strongly recommended as the
Army has had positive experiences in employing the ESC technique
in developing contacts with other foreign armies. The U.S.-PRC
Executive Steering Committee should be a functional exchange at
the high-intermediate level of leadership (major general and
below) to minimize its politicization.
In preparing to deal with their Chinese counterparts,
another technique that the U.S. Army should adopt is the use of
relative rather than rigid reciprocity. A policy of rigid
reciprocity, whereby each exchange must be matched in substance
and style by the two parties, will tend to limit Sino-American
army interaction because of the disparity in the relative wealth
and technology between the Chinese and Americans. Rather than
reciprocating event for event, U.S. and PRC Army objectives
should be matched in terms of relatively equal levels of
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priority, accessibility, and transparency.
Another tactic beneficial to the engagement process would be
for the Army leadership to ensure that Department of the Army
civilians are routinely included. These key members of the "Total
Army" team bring a continuity that is highly valued by the
Chinese. Military leaders in China tend to remain in a given
position much longer than most of their uniformed American
counterparts.
A final key procedure that should be developed is a periodic
internal Army reassessment of its engagement with the PLA.
Objectives of the reassessment would be to measure the efficiency
and effectiveness of executing the China strategy as well as the
cost and benefits of engaging the PLA. Regular reassessments will
allow the Army not only to re-evaluate its engagement goals and
objectives, but also refine its tactics, techniques, and
procedures for working with the PLA. Scheduled evaluations can
also be used by the Army to capture the actual monetary costs
associated with U.S.-PRC army-to-army ties. As the program
matures, this fiscal data could be used to make China engagement
part of the Army's Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) input for
programmatic funding. Programmed funds would eliminate the
requirement for the Army either to use its limited "initiative"
funds or find other bill payers for each China initiative.
Including China engagement in the Army's FYDP would have the
additional benefit of ensuring everyone would be working from the
same game plan.
ENDORSING THE U.S. ARMY'S PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PLA
Conclusions.
A historic opportunity is still present to secure a
more orderly, less disruptive Chinese entry into
international and regional affairs than occurred with
the rise of other powers in the past century. But that
opportunity will be lost if the leaders of China and
the United States do not seize upon it during the
coming decade.55
Part of the current U.S. China policy of comprehensive
engagement, designed to take advantage of the historic
opportunity mentioned above, is for the U.S. Army to renew its
peacetime engagement with China's PLA. The reasons for renewed
army-to-army ties are clear. First, China's relevance to U.S.
interest, which is already significant, will increase with
China's rapidly growing power. Second, the United States has
resources at its disposal that can positively influence China's
development. Finally, one of the most effective resources for
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engaging the PRC is America's Army.
To maximize its effectiveness as an instrument of U.S. China
policy, the American Army must learn from its past interaction
with the PLA. The recommendations offered here are by no means
exhaustive. A significant limiting factor is the lack of
peacetime engagement doctrine and supporting tactics, techniques,
and procedures. Thus, a final recommendation is for the U.S. Army
to use its ongoing work on the China engagement strategy as the
baseline for the development of peacetime engagement doctrine.
This doctrine should then yield the full range of tactics,
techniques, and procedures necessary for building a clear,
consistent, coordinated, and comprehensive campaign plan for
engaging China's PLA. Such a carefully planned approach to
peacefully engaging the PRC would, to paraphrase Rear Admiral
McDevitt, be the modern day functional equivalent of America's
Army "keeping its powder dry."
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APPENDIX A
HIGH LEVEL SINO-U.S. ARMY-TO-ARMY EXCHANGES
Among the senior U.S. and Chinese Army officials who conducted
high level visits in the 1980s were:
NAME

POSITION

YEAR

Lieutenant General
William R. Richardson

Commander, U.S. Army
Combined Arms Center

1981

General William R.
Richardson

Commanding General,
Training & Doctrine Command

1983

General John A. Wickham

Chief of Staff
of the U.S. Army

1986

General Maxwell Thurman

Commanding General,
U.S. Army Training &
Doctrine Command

1988

Lieutenant General Xu
Huizi

Deputy Chief of PLA
General Staff

1988
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APPENDIX B
SINO-U.S. ARMY-TO-ARMY TRAINING EXCHANGES
August
17- 29,
1985

Chinese observed U.S. individual, specialized,
collective, and combined arms training at Fort
Benning, GA; Fort Bragg, NC; and Fort Irvin, CA.

October
14-26,
1986

Americans visited PLA Armor and Artillery
Academies, observed Chinese combined arms training, and received presentations on PLA militia
training.

October
3-16,
1987

Chinese observed curriculum, composition and
selection process at the U.S. Military Academy,
West Point, NY; computer simulation and academic
program at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA; discussed computer simulation, the Joint
Readiness Training Center, force structure, and
training management at Fort Monroe, VA; and observed a
combined arms live-fire exercise at U.S. Army Western
Command (now U.S. Army Pacific).

September Americans visited China's National Defense
14-25,
University, the Nanjing Command College, an
1988
airborne training brigade at Yingshan, and a live-fire
exercise at Luo Tu Shan.
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APPENDIX C
FIVE PILLARS OF SINO-AMERICAN SECURITY ENGAGEMENT
In his October 11, 1995, testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Asian Pacific Affairs Subcommittee,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Joseph Nye listed the following five pillars through which the
United States is implementing its policy of security engagement
with the People's Republic of China.
(1) High-level visits. This includes visits such as Defense
Secretary William Perry's to China in October 1994.
(2) Functional exchanges. These are working level
professional exchanges such as those between our National Defense
Universities and our military medical communities.
(3) Routine military activities and confidence building
measures. Included in this category are ship visits (such as the
visit of USS Bunker Hill to Qingdao in March 1995) and defense
transparency talks.
(4) Participation in multinational security fora. The
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command hosted a series of
conferences and symposia in which PLA participation has been
fairly good.
(5) Defense conversion activities. Through the activities of
the Sino-American Joint Defense Conversion Commission, we seek to
maintain a channel of communications with an important element of
the PRC's defense establishment.56
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APPENDIX D
REASONS FOR SINO-AMERICAN SECURITY ENGAGEMENT
In his October 11, 1995, Congressional testimony, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph
Nye listed the following seven reasons why the United States is
implementing its policy of security engagement with China.
(1) Security dialogues and military exchanges are important
during periods of international transition. These dialogues get
at the heart of issues of greatest importance to the countries
involved. . . . China's Pacific power and presence is still in a
formative stage and outcomes can be influenced. This is why we
choose to engage China, not contain it.
(2) U.S. allies and friends in the region support a policy
of engagement. Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines,
and Thailand have all pressed the United States to engage China
on a broad range of issues, including security concerns.
(3) We are trying to promote transparency and mutual
understanding. . . . In this post-Cold War environment, we want
to promote transparency and build confidence in the Pacific--not
arsenals.
(4) China holds the key to progress in a variety of regional
trouble spots and, increasingly, in global security issues. . . .
the PRC's support and cooperation is vital to our ability to
establish effective international arms control and
nonproliferation regimes.
(5) The military and security elite in China will play a
critical role during a period of internal political transition.
The military retains power and access in modern China and has a
voice on issues of concern to us. Dialogue allows us to gain
valuable insights into the evolving political system, and allows
us a line of communication with this powerful entity.
(6) We must avoid and prevent military accidents and
dangerous misperceptions. Our interests in the Asia-Pacific
region mean that we will likely in the future operate in the same
areas as Chinese forces.
(7) China must be encouraged to join and participate in
regional and global security regimes and institutions . . . that
support U.S. national security objectives. . . . As a global and
Pacific power, we can facilitate the process of drawing China
into those collective regimes and frameworks that enhance mutual
understanding and confidence, and ultimately stability.57
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